

Tutorial on Bayesian Methods and the MaxEnt Principle

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Outline

- Basic probability theory(Peter)
- Simple examples of Bayesian Inference.....(Peter)
- Types of probabilistic inference(Peter)
- Case Studies.....(Peter)
- Advanced Modeling.....(Wray)
- Graphical (probabilistic) models.....(Wray)
- Computation.....(Wray)
- Priors.....(Wray)
- Other views and ideas.....(Peter and Wray)

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Bayesian Inference I

- **Q1: How should a rational agent form beliefs under uncertainty?**
- **Q2: How should a rational agent make decisions under uncertainty?**
- **Initially concentrate on beliefs of a rational agent.**
- **Must Generalize logic:**
 - T or F (0 or 1) --> degree of belief (numerical).
 - degree of belief depends on particular (known) context
- **Cox's Proof shows that probability theory is the only consistent theory that generalizes logic in this way (more later!).**
- **Example probability statement:**
 - $P(\text{Clinton will win in 1996} \mid \text{Bosnia-resolved-by-1996, 1995}) = .4$
 - .4 is degree of belief
 - “Clinton will win in 1996” is target proposition (form beliefs about it)
 - “1995” is a proposition describing the current conditioning context.

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Bayesian Inference II

- Bosnia-resolved -by-1996 is a conditioning proposition.
- The | symbol separates the target proposition from the conditioning proposition(s).
- **Target Proposition:**
 - Can be atomic or Boolean combination of propositions.
 - Propositions can be quantified—e.g. “All people in this room are older than 25 years”.
- **Conditioning Proposition:**
 - Can be atomic or Boolean combination of propositions.
 - Always includes a proposition representing the context of the probability assertion (sometimes omitted).
 - Can include quantified proposition—e.g. “All people in this room employed”.

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Basic Probability Laws I

- **Probability Law of Excluded Middle (Negation Law):**
 $P(A) = 1 - P(\text{not } A)$
- **Positivity Law:**
 $0 \leq P(A) \leq 1$
- **Non-Truth Functionality:**
 - e.g. $0 \leq P(A \& B) \leq \min(P(A), P(B))$ $[P(A \& B) = P(A, B)]$
 - The probability of the conjunction is not determined by its components (but is bounded by them).
- **Disjunction:**
 - $P(A \text{ or } B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \& B)$
 - If A and B mutually exclusive, then
 - $P(A \text{ or } B) = P(A) + P(B)$ (Additive Law of probabilities)

Basic Probability Laws II

- **Multiplication Law:**
 $P(A, B, C, \dots, I) = P(A|I)P(B|A, I)P(C|A, B, I) \dots$
 $= P(B|I)P(A|B, I)P(C|A, B, I) \dots$
 $= P(C|I)P(B|C, I)P(A|B, C, I) \dots$ etc.
- **Bayes Theorem**
 - From Multiplication Law
 $P(A|I)P(B|A, I) = P(B|I)P(A|B, I)$
 $\rightarrow P(A|I) = P(B|I)P(A|B, I) / P(B|A, I)$ [Bayes Theorem]
- **Marginalization (Discrete)**
 $P(A|C) = P(A, B|C) + P(A, \text{not } B|C)$ [B is binary auxiliary variable]
 $P(A|C) = \sum_i P(A, X_i|C)$ [X_i is an i-way auxiliary variable]
 $= \sum_i P(A|X_i, C) * P(X_i|C)$
- **Marginalization (Continuous)**
 $P(A|C) = \int P(A, x|C) dx$
 $= \int P(A|x, C) * f(x|C) dx$

Examples of Marginalization


- **Discrete**
 $P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{School}) = P(\text{Pass-PhD, Female}|\text{School}) +$
 $P(\text{Pass-PhD, Male}|\text{School})$
 $= P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{Female}, \text{School})P(\text{Female}|\text{School}) +$
 $P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{Male}, \text{School})P(\text{Male}|\text{School})$
 $P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{Female}, \text{USA}) = \sum_{\text{schools}} P(\text{Pass-PhD}, \text{School}|\text{Female}, \text{USA})$
- **Continuous**
 $P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{USA}) = \int P(\text{Pass-PhD}, \text{Age}|\text{USA}) d(\text{Age})$
 $= \int P(\text{Pass-PhD}|\text{Age}, \text{USA}) * f(\text{Age}|\text{USA}) d(\text{Age})$
- **Marginalization Eliminates “Nuisance” Variables:**
 - The effect of Marginalization is to eliminate explicit dependence on the variable(s) that are marginalized away.

Probability Density Functions

- **Probabilities are numbers from 0 to 1, representing degree of belief in target proposition given conditioning information.**
- E.g.--Q: What is probability that this rock weighs exactly 1 Kg.?**
Ans: Zero (infinitesimal)
 \rightarrow Need probability density functions!
- **Definition: Probability Density Function (pdf).**
 $f(x|C)$ is a piece-wise continuous function of x s.t.
 - $f(x|C) \geq 0$
 - $\int f(x|C) dx = 1$ (i.e. x must have some value!)
- **Probabilities found by integrating pdfs over specific ranges.**
 - Example:
 $P(1\text{Kg.} \leq \text{weight}(\text{rock}) < 1.1 \text{ Kg.}) = \int f(\text{weight}(\text{rock})) dw$
 i.e. the probability that the rock weighs between 1 and 1.1 Kg. is given by the integral of the pdf over the range. (see next slide)

PDF Example

Area under curve is required probability:



Note:

- $f(x|C)$ can be > 1 [$f(x|C)$ is not a probability.]
- $f(x|C)$ can be regarded as the limiting result of a probabilistic histogram as the bin sizes go to zero.

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Probability Notes 1

- **All Probabilities are conditional probabilities:**
 - always condition on context
 - Sometimes conditioning information understood (not explicit)--Danger!!
- **There is no such thing as THE probability of a proposition:**
 - As learn new conditioning information and choose to use it, the resulting conditional probability will be different than previous conditional probabilities--i.e the best estimate probability changes with new information.
 - Probability statements can refer to the next outcome in a series or to future values based on current evidence, but not to long term frequency.
- **Conditional Probability \neq Probability of a Conditional !!**
 - e.g. "Where ever there is smoke there is likely to be fire".
 - Is $P(\text{Fire} | \text{Smoke}, \text{context}) = \text{high} (.9)$
 - Not $P(\text{Smoke} \rightarrow \text{Fire} | \text{context}) = \text{high} (.9)$; [No smoke events count as evidence!]

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Probability Notes II

- **Probability is not a Frequency (it is a measure of belief).**
 - Can have a probability of a single event e.g. Prob. of Clinton being re-elected in 1996.
 - probability equals expected frequency in repeated trials (probability and frequency are closely related).
- **Conditioning Information can be Hypothetical.**
 - e.g. "If I miss my fight, I can probably get another one today".
 - conditioning information does not have to be true.
 - can consider many mutually inconsistent conditioning contexts.
 - probabilistic inference is monotonic--i.e. do not have to change previous beliefs if the context changes (compute new probabilities in the new context instead).
- **Odds map probabilities from $[0,1]$ to $[0,\infty]$ --i.e.**
 - Odds(A) = $P(A)/P(\text{not } A)$
 - = $P(A)/(1 - P(A))$ [Only good for Binary propositions]
 - To transform from Odds to probability use: $P = \text{Odds}/(1 + \text{Odds})$

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Alternative Forms of Bayes Theorem

- **Basic Form of Bayes theorem for a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses $H(i)$, given evidence E :**

$$P(H_i|E,C) = \frac{P(H_i|C)*P(E|H_i,C)}{P(E|C)}$$

posterior prob. = prior prob. x likelihood / normalizing const.

Where $P(E|C) = \sum P(E|H_i,C)*P(H_i|C)$ ---i.e. marginalize over all H_i .

Note that $P(E|C)$ does not depend on H_i --- it is just a normalizing constant

- **Relative version of Bayes:**

$$\frac{P(H_i|E,C)}{P(H_j|E,C)} = \frac{P(H_i|C)*P(E|H_i,C)}{P(H_j|C)*P(E|H_j,C)}$$

- Eliminates the normalizing constant, but requirement that $\sum_i P(H_i|E,C) = 1$ allows the $P(H_i|E,C)$'s to be normalized.

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Example of Bayesian Inference

Situation: There are 64 coins in a box, one of these coins is double-headed (H2), the rest are ordinary (H1). A single coin is drawn from the box.

- **Q1:** What is the probability that this coin is the double-headed coin?

Ans: $P(H2|C) = 1/64$ [C is the context]

- Principle of Indifference (or more generally, Maximum Entropy).

New Situation: The selected coin is flipped, and the result (R1) is "heads". [A "tails" result means that not double-headed coin]

- **Q2:** What is the new probability that this coin is the double-headed coin?

Ans:--Use Bayes!!

- Relative version of Bayes is easiest to use.

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Double-Headed Coin Example (Cont.)

- **Relative Bayes for H1 and H2:**

$$\frac{P(H2|R1,C)}{P(H1|R1,C)} = \frac{P(H2|C)*P(R1|H2,C)}{P(H1|C)*P(R1|H1,C)}$$

$P(H2|C) = 1/64$ (prev. slide); $P(H1|C) = 63/64$ (By normalization)

$P(R1|H2,C) = 1$ (only possible outcome); $P(R1|H1,C) = 1/2$ (fair coin).

Therefore: $P(H2|R1,C)/P(H1|R1,C) = (1/63)*2 = 2/63$ (increased prob.)

And: $P(H2|R1,C) = 2/65$

New Situation: The selected coin is flipped again, and the result (R2) is also "heads".

[Note: If any flip gives "tails" then $P(H2|E,C) = 0$]

Want: $P(H2|R1,R2,C)$ --> Bayes again!

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Double-Headed Coin Example (Cont.)

- **Relative Bayes again:**

$$\frac{P(H2|R1,R2,C)}{P(H1|R1,R2,C)} = \frac{P(H2|C)*P(R1,R2|H2,C)}{P(H1|C)*P(R1,R2|H1,C)}$$

- $P(R1,R2|H2,C) = 1$ (only possibility), but what is $P(R1,R2|H1,C)$?

Note: In principle, $P(R1,R2|H1,C)$ could be any value from 0 to 1/2.

Solution: Use principle of maximum entropy to find the probability that maximizes the entropy subject to any constraints (more later)!

Result: Conditional Independence--i.e.

$$P(R1,R2|H1,C) = P(R1|H1,C)*P(R2|H1,C) \quad \text{or}$$

$$P(R1|R2,H1,C) = P(R1|H1,C)$$

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Double-Headed Coin Example (Cont.)

- **Two Flip (R1,R2) Conclusion:**

$$\frac{P(H2|R1,R2,C)}{P(H1|R1,R2,C)} = \frac{P(H2|C)*P(R1,R2|H2,C)}{P(H1|C)*P(R1,R2|H1,C)} = \frac{(1/64)*1}{(63/64)*(1/2)*(1/2)} = \frac{4}{63}$$

Which gives: $P(H2|R1,R2,C) = 4/69$

- **Recursive form of Bayes (when evidence is conditionally independent).**

$$\frac{P(H2|R1,R2,C)}{P(H1|R1,R2,C)} = \frac{P(H2|C)*P(R1,R2|H2,C)}{P(H1|C)*P(R1,R2|H1,C)} = \frac{P(H2|C)*P(R1|H2,C)*P(R2|H2,C)}{P(H1|C)*P(R1|H1,C)*P(R2|H2,C)}$$

$$= \frac{P(H2|R1,C)*P(R2|H2,C)}{P(H1|R1,C)*P(R2|H2,C)} = \frac{\text{Prior} * \text{Likelihood}}{\text{Prior} * \text{Likelihood}}$$

i.e. Previous posterior probability becomes the prior on the next iteration!

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HIV Testing Example

Situation 1: A patient enters a clinic.

Q1: What is the probability that this patient is HIV+ ?

Ans: $P(\text{HIV+}|\text{Clinic}) = .01$ (answer depends on clinic, location etc.)

Note: $P(\text{HIV+}|\text{Clinic}) \neq P(\text{HIV+}|\text{USA})$ (“The” prior probability)

Situation 2: A blood sample from the patient is tested using the ELISA test, and is found +ve (E1+).

Q2: What is the prob. that the patient is HIV+ given E1+ ?

Ans: Relative Bayes: Posterior ratio = Prior-ratio*Likelihood-ratio

$$\frac{P(\text{HIV+}|E1+,C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|E1+,C)} = \frac{P(\text{HIV+}|C)*P(E1+|\text{HIV+},C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|C)*P(E1+|\text{HIV-},C)} = \frac{.01 \times .98}{.99 \times .05} = .198$$

--> $P(\text{HIV+}|E1+,C) = .165$ (much less than 1!)

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HIV Testing Example (Cont.)

Situation 3: The blood sample from the patient is tested using the ELISA test, and is found -ve (E1-).

Q3: What is the prob. that the patient is HIV+ given E1- ?

Ans: Relative Bayes: Posterior ratio = Prior-ratio*Likelihood-ratio

$$\frac{P(\text{HIV+}|E1-,C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|E1-,C)} = \frac{P(\text{HIV+}|C)*P(E1-|\text{HIV+},C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|C)*P(E1-|\text{HIV-},C)} = \frac{.01 \times .02}{.99 \times .95} = .00021$$

--> $P(\text{HIV+}|E1+,C) = .00021$ (from a prior of .01 !)

Situation 4: The blood sample from the patient is tested again using the ELISA test, and is found +ve (E2+) after the first test was +ve (E1+).

Q4: What is the prob. that the patient is HIV+ given E1+ and E2+ ?

Ans: Relative Bayes: Posterior ratio = Prior-ratio*Likelihood-ratio

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HIV Testing Example (Cont.)

$$\frac{P(\text{HIV+}|E1+,E2+,C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|E1+,E2+,C)} = \frac{P(\text{HIV+}|C)*P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|C)*P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV-},C)} = \frac{.01 \times ???}{.99 \times ???}$$

Q5: What value should be used for $P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C)$ and $P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV-},C)$?

Possible Answers:

Total Dependence: $P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C) = P(E1+|\text{HIV+},C)$
(No new Info.) $P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV-},C) = P(E1+|\text{HIV-},C)$

Conditional Independence:

$P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C) = P(E1+|\text{HIV+},C) * P(E2+|\text{HIV+},C)$
 $P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV-},C) = P(E1+|\text{HIV-},C) * P(E2+|\text{HIV-},C)$

Empirically Determined Values: E.g.

$P(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C) = \#(E1+,E2+|\text{HIV+},C) / \#(\text{all test results}|\text{HIV+},C)$

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HIV Testing Example (Cont.)

Situation 5: The blood sample from the patient is tested again using the Western Blot test, and is found -ve (WB-), after an ELISA test was found +ve (E1+).

Q6: What is the prob. that the patient is HIV+ given E1+ and WB- ?

Ans: Relative Bayes: Posterior ratio = Prior-ratio*Likelihood-ratio

$$\frac{P(\text{HIV+}|E1+,WB-,C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|E1+,WB-,C)} = \frac{P(\text{HIV+}|C)*P(E1+,WB-|\text{HIV+},C)}{P(\text{HIV-}|C)*P(E1+,WB-|\text{HIV-},C)} = \frac{.01 \times ???}{.99 \times ???}$$

Q7: What value should be used for $P(E1+,WB-|\text{HIV+},C)$ and $P(E1+,WB-|\text{HIV-},C)$?

Possible Answer: Assume conditional independence--i.e. result of tests depends only sample--not on the results of other tests.

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HIV Testing Example (Cont.)

$$\frac{P(\text{HIV+}|\text{E1+,WB-,C})}{P(\text{HIV-}|\text{E1+,WB-,C})} = \frac{P(\text{HIV+}|C) \cdot P(\text{E1+,WB-}|\text{HIV+,C})}{P(\text{HIV-}|C) \cdot P(\text{E1+,WB-}|\text{HIV-,C})} = \frac{.01 \times .0001}{.99 \times .05} = .000002$$

-> $P(\text{HIV+}|\text{E1+,WB-,C}) = .000002$ i.e. The WB- evidence overwhelms the E1+ evidence.

Summary--HIV Example:

- Probabilistic inference is an update procedure---prior beliefs--> posterior
- Even though there may be a large change in relative probability in a Bayesian update, the absolute magnitude may still be small.
- How new evidence interacts with previous evidence depends on the domain. Whether conditional independence (maxent) applies is domain dependent.
- Priors are dependent on the specific context of the inference.
- Evidence is never “contradictory” (e.g. E1+ and WB-), but different pieces of evidence can swing the probability toward 0 or 1.

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Types of Probabilistic Inference

- **Direct (Likelihood):**
 - Likelihood determination
 - Maximum Likelihood estimation.
- **Inductive:**
 - Posterior Probability Inference (inverse inference)
 - Maximum Posterior probability estimation
 - Abductive Reasoning
- **Projective (marginalization):**
 - eliminate nuisance variables
 - Important special case--convolution
- **Transductive:**
 - i.e Find probability of new evidence given old.
- **Probability Transformation (Re-parameterization):**

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Direct–

Example (Likelihood):

$P(\text{Observed Intensity}|\text{Intrinsic luminosity, distance}) = N(\text{mean, var})$

- Likelihood **is** the domain model (states how observables depend on the true state of the world, assumed known).
- Likelihood is usually a function of (conditioned on) the state of the world.

Maximum Likelihood Inference:

- Example: $P(\text{heart-attack}|\text{age}) = f(\text{age})$. Given that someone has had a heart-attack, what is their most likely age?
- Vary the conditioning variable(s) to find the value(s) that maximize the probability (or pdf). This value(s) is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator(s).
- Can estimate the uncertainty of the ML estimator by looking at the change in probability around the maximum as the variable(s) are varied.

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Inductive–I

Induction $\equiv P(\text{Model} | \text{Data})$

$$\propto P(\text{Model}) * P(\text{Data} | \text{Model}) \text{ [Bayes]}$$

Previous Examples:

- Double-Headed Coin example (Binary target variable, discrete evidence)
- HIV Testing example.

General Inductive Inference = Inverse Inference

- i.e. If know true state of the world, then can predict the data (probabilistically), but given the data want the true state of the world.
- e.g. X-ray crystallography, IRS audit prediction, diagnosis,....

Bayes is general Solution to Inverse Problems

- Bayes finds the posterior probability distribution over possible models given data and a prior distribution over models.

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Inductive–II

Maximum A posteriori Probability (MAP) Estimation:

- Picks the model(s) with maximum posterior probability
- Most posterior probability distributions have many local maxima.
- Need to search to find maximum (or local maximum)
- Need to indicate how concentrated the probability distribution is around the maximum (“error bars”).

Why find MAP estimates?

- Posterior probability distribution contains all the information from prior beliefs and data—the MAP estimate is a summary that loses information.
- The most likely posterior model is not generally the same as the mean model, and can vary depending on how the problem is parameterized.
- Hill climbing is a simple procedure for finding (local) MAP estimates.

Conclusion:

Where convenient use full posterior distribution!

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Projective–

Project out the variable(s) of interest = marginalize over all “nuisance” variables.

Example:

$$f(\mu, \sigma | X) \longrightarrow f(\mu | X) = \int f(\mu, \sigma | X) d\sigma \\ = \int f(\mu | \sigma, x) * P(\sigma | x) dx$$

$$\text{For a Normal: } f(\mu | X) = \frac{\Gamma(l/2) * S^{(l-1)}}{\sqrt{\pi} * \Gamma(l/2 - 1/2) * \{S^2 + (m - \mu)^2\}}$$

—Student “T” distribution.

Where S = sample standard deviation, m = sample mean, and $\Gamma()$ is the Gamma function.

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Transduction–

Transductive inference gives the probability of new data given old data (by marginalizing over model possibilities).

Example (Previous HIV Example):

$$P(WB+ | E1+) \\ = P(WB+, HIV+ | E1+) + P(WB+, HIV- | E1+) \\ = P(WB+ | HIV+) * P(HIV+ | E1+) + P(WB+ | HIV-) * P(HIV- | E1+)$$

Where we have assumed conditional independence of evidence e.g. $P(WB+ | HIV+) = P(WB+ | HIV+, E1+)$

Can use transduction to evaluate the effect of evidence that could be obtained.

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Types of Probabilistic Inference, –Probability Transformation–

Probability transformation allows a PDF in one representation to be transformed to another.

Example: Transform from Polar to Cartesian representation, i.e.

$$f(r, \theta) \longrightarrow h(x, y)$$

$$\text{Answer: } f(r, \theta) = h(x, y) * \text{Det} \left[\frac{d(x, y)}{d(r, \theta)} \right];$$

I.E. Multiply by the Jacobian to transform correctly.

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Thumb-Tack Example

We toss a thumbtack N times with probability θ of it landing on its flat



Direct Inference: If know θ , what is the probability that will get n “flats” in N trials?

Ans: From logic get Binomial Distribution:

$$P(n|\theta,N) = \frac{n! (N-n)!}{N!} * \theta^n (1 - \theta)^{(N-n)}$$

Thumb-Tack Example II

Inductive Inference: Given number of “sides” n, and total number of trials N, what is θ ?

Ans: Use Bayes to invert the binomial distribution:

$f(\theta|x) \propto \pi(\theta)*l(x|\theta)$. Use (conjugate) prior dist $\pi(\theta) \propto \theta^\alpha (1-\theta)^\alpha$

$$\text{Then } f(\theta|x) = \beta(\theta|x) = \frac{\Gamma(N + 2\alpha)}{\Gamma(n + \alpha)*\Gamma(N-n+\alpha)} * \theta^{(n+\alpha-1)}(1-\theta)^{(N-n+\alpha-1)}$$

Note: The beta distribution gives the posterior distribution on the unknown parameter θ , but it is very similar in form to the binomial distribution.

Thumb-Tack Example III

Transductive Inference: Given n previous “flats” in N trials, what is the probability of getting r “flats” in R trials?

Ans: Marginalize over θ —i.e.

$$P(r|n,N,R) = \int P(r|R,\theta) * f(\theta|n,N) d\theta$$

$$= \frac{n! * (r + R)! * (N + n - R - r)! * N!}{r! * (n-r)! * R! * (N-R)! * (N + n)!}$$

This is the beta-binomial distribution (independent of θ , but still dependent on the conditionally independent trials model).

Summary of Probabilistic Inference

- **General method for reasoning under uncertainty.**
- **Simplest generalization of classical (binary) logic**
 - allows degrees of belief (not just 0 or 1)
 - explicitly conditions belief on specific known evidence
- **Probabilistic Inference computes degrees of belief (does not make decisions--this requires Decision Theory).**
- **Bayesian Inference provides a way of computing beliefs given particular evidence.**
 - No such thing as “the” probability of a proposition.
 - Probabilities are not frequencies, but these are closely related.
 - Evidence can be hypothetical